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Abstract  
Work on geographically targeted spending and its electoral connections, particularly in a 
sporting context is a well-studied phenomena. However, much, if not all examination has 
tended to focus on grants as being homogenous without taking into the account the 
heterogeneity of awards. Therefore, this paper decomposes grants into different types of 
facilities (All, Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA), Soccer and Multisport) and tests whether 
the theory of “sports-pork” holds for all. Secondly, the common binary measure to examine 
bias is replaced with a new distance variable, which measures the distance between an 
individual’s hometown and successful club. Finally, for the first time a new relationship is 
examined, noting the difference between a grant a club applied for relative to what it received. 
Successful applicants geographically proximate to the Minister for Sport, Finance and 
Taoiseach receive larger awards, however also lower portions of applied funding. Moreover, 
examining individual specific effects the bias in distribution for both the Minister of Sport and 
Taoiseach has decreased under recent individuals. 
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1. Introduction 
Pork barrel politics is the process where a politician or political party promises something to 
his or her constituents in an effort to gain their support and assist in re-election. These promises 
can range from the construction of public projects to the retention of local services. Cain et al. 
(1990) and Weingast et al. (1981) indicate the electoral connection in pork-barrel politics is a 
well-established phenomenon. Political actors can reward their core voters (Cox & McGubbins, 
1986) or target floating or swing voters (Lindbeck & Weibull, 1987). In the case of the Republic 
of Ireland1, this theory is no less pertinent, most notably for sports capital grants. Bailey and 
Connolly (1997) noted, lack of central responsibility along with no independent body to 
monitor the geographical and socio-economic spread, meant grant allocations were much 
weaker and open to political influence, in comparison to the United Kingdom. While Considine 
et al. (2004, 2008) Considine and Doran (2016), Suiter and O’Malley (2014a, 2014b) have 
examined this political bias, grants for sports facilities have always been treated as 
homogenous. While a politician’s main goal is the re-election to government, they may feel 
that awarding certain types of sports may better place them in a position to achieve this 
outcome.    
For instance, Delaney and Fahey (2005) note that Gaelic Games’ organisational strength is 
much greater than the relative number who engage in the sport. Its structure is based on a strong 
voluntarist community model of sports organisation. It is difficult to estimate the number of 
volunteers, however figures released by the GAA (2015) indicated that registered members, 
which includes players were over 500,000. Moreover, Gaelic teams tend to share a deep 
attachment in their locality, particularly in rural areas. Awarding a large grant to a club such as 
this, may stand a Minister in a better position to be re-elected than to an Athletics club or some 
other applicant where the successful benefit to the potential political figure may not be felt as 
strongly. 
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Furthermore, certain political figures may have a deep affiliation with a particular sporting 
code. Jim McDaid, former Minister for Sport2 was a former winner of three national titles with 
University College Galway soccer team, captaining them on two occasions. Moreover, he also 
served as a medical officer for the Donegal county Gaelic Football team. Similarly, former 
Taoiseach and Minister for Finance, Brian Cowen was not only a President of his local GAA 
club Clara, but also played Gaelic football for Offaly in the 1980s. Given these affiliations, 
both known and unknown, figures in positions of power may wish to reward applicants in their 
locality, even more so to sports they have a connection with. 
Utilising a newly assembled dataset with geocoded data on successful applicants, along with 
the intended sport the grant was awarded for, this study aims to exam the heterogeneity in 
different awards and to test whether the theory of pork barrelling holds for different facilities. 
Secondly, a new method is utilised to measure political favouritism. This is the distance 
between the location of an individual’s hometown and successful clubs location. Finally, a new 
measure of sports-pork is utilised – this is the level of funding a club received relative to what 
it applied for. This paper is structured as follows. The following section discusses the literature 
relating to pork barrel politics. A discussion of the data is given as well as the estimation 
method utilised. This is preceded by results and concluded with a discussion and implications. 
2. Literature  
2.1 Pork-Barrelling – the role of the politician  
Stigler (1971) was one of the first to formalise that government regulation served the interests 
of small lobby groups rather than the interest of the wider community. It was assumed that 
politicians, regulators and interest groups all operate in their own self-interest. Politicians are 
concerned mainly with gaining and maintaining elected office. In a political setting politicians 
reward constituents through favourable policies in order to achieve this. As Hoare (1992) noted, 
pork barrelling in a political context is the selective geographical allocation of publicly-
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controlled funds and resources for the purpose of gaining votes from electors in locations. 
Archer (1983) and Hoare (1983, 1992) provide detailed reviews in regards to pork barrelling. 
Individual seat pork barrelling, is primarily what this study is interested in. This is employed 
by individual politicians, either in government or opposition, who use their position to direct 
resources toward their own constituency in order to maintain or improve their personal vote at 
the next election. This type of pork barrel politics is particularly prevalent in the U.S where a 
large level of political power is vested in individual members of the House of Representatives 
or Senate (Hoare 1992). Risk-averse politicians will invest relatively larger levels in their core 
support groups, particularly when strong individual legislators have ample opportunity to 
reward their constituents (Cox & McGubbins, 1986). Furthermore, Golden and Picci (2008) 
argue that open-list proportional representation (PR) 3 can incentivize intra-party competition 
pitching candidates against each other in the quest for votes (Carey & Shugart, 1995).  
Different measures on how best to quantify the theory of pork barrel politics have been put 
forward in the literature. Weingast (1994) note these approaches have been defined as 
legislative logrolling, supplemental or discretionary policies, or distributive public policies. 
Levitt and Synder (1995) state measures tend to focus on the monetary value awarded to a 
particular programme or geographic area. The premise behind this is the higher the award the 
more benefit the constituency receives and in turn the greater the benefit to the public 
representative, in terms of votes (Suiter & O’Malley, 2014b). The number of projects or unique 
allocations an area receives has been another measure utilised. Rather than having one large 
award, a number of smaller awards may provide greater credit-claiming opportunities for a 
legislator (Bickers & Stein, 1994; 1996).     
The discretionary nature of sports spending, make it an ideal example of pork barrel politics, 
or as Denemark (2000) note, a geographically targetable and divisible good. Quirk and Fort 
(1997), Keating (1999) and Zarestsky (2001) have shown that sports-pork is rife within the 
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United States. Work by Gaunt (1999) provide evidence of priority funding appearing to have 
gone to government-held marginal electorates in Australia. A developed literature has emerged 
on the topic within Ireland (see Considine et al., 2004; 2008; Suiter & O’Malley, 2014a; 2014b; 
Considine & Doran, 2016). Findings point to constituencies housing the Minister for Finance 
and Sport doing particularly well in both overall monetary value and unique projects awarded. 
The following section will discuss the data which is utilised in this analysis.  
3. Data and Preliminary Analysis 
In order to test the perceived bias in the allocation of sports capital grant spending, two different 
measures are utilised. Firstly, the overall monetary value an applicant received, a measure 
utilised in Suiter & O’Malley (2014b). A potential drawback with this measure, along with a 
count of projects awarded to an area, is that it does not take into account the funding applied 
for by a club. For instance, if an applicant close to a Decision Maker receives a grant of €70,000 
but originally applied for €120,000 does this appear more favourable than awarding a grant of 
€42,000 to an applicant who applied for €45,000? Therefore, for the first time this study 
analyses the difference between the levels of funding a club applied for, against the amount it 
received. While previous studies have identified that the appropriate Minister rewards their 
locality disproportionality, relative to the national average, these same studies have never 
factored in the amount the locality seeks. For instance Considine et al. (2008) noted that when 
Donegal’s Jim McDaid was Minster for Sport, Donegal had the sixth poorest success rate for 
county applications. It could be the case, as they note that applicants believe that having a 
Minister in their locality can make a difference for them. However, this analysis was for the 
success rate of applications, not the difference between what was sought and received. Of 
course there are other reasons why a club may not receive their full allocation of funding. 
Scarcity of funds, inaccurate figures entered on application forms, as well as including invalid 
elements of projects (car park facilities, no proof of planning permission provided).  
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While Gaunt (1999), Considine et al. (2008), Suiter and O’Malley (2014a, 2014b), Considine 
and Doran (2016) utilise pre-determined spatial units (counties, electoral constituencies, 
federal electorates) to analyse the effects of political bias, this measure can be hindered due the 
redrawing of electoral boundaries. To overcome this, this study utilises a distance variable, 
thanks to geocoded data. Linear distance (km) is measured between the successful applicant 
and the locality of the various decision makers over the period 2002-2015. Ministerial changes 
occurred in this period, so too does the point of reference. Regional characteristics associated 
with the successful applicant are derived from Electoral district data4. A list of variables which 
are utilised in this analysis can be seen in Table 1. These control variables are standard variables 
in the literature, however Electoral district statistics have never been utilised previously. Suiter 
and O’Malley (2014a), (2014b), Considine and Doran (2016) have used constituency and 
county data, thus this study allows a much larger level of regional variability. Before an 
empirical estimation is undertaken, it is worthwhile carrying out a descriptive analysis of the 
county allocation of successful applicants. 
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3.1 Preliminary Analysis  
In total data is available for 7,615 5 individual grants over the period 2002-2015 totalling over 
€560millon. Given budgetary cutbacks no sports capital grants were awarded in the periods 
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 or 2013. Although a number of special allocations were awarded, these 
were given to national and regional associations, thus are not considered. Grants allocated 
included sums as small as €200 to the Laois Community Games in 2007 and large sums to 
Munster Rugby in 2007 and 2008. On average applicants received 51% of their application. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent Variables 
Grant  Log of Funding club received  Department of Transport 
Tourism and Sport 
(Various Years) 
Received/Sought  Proportion received of amount sought (%) Department of Transport 
Tourism and Sport 
(Various Years) 
Control Variables 
Pop  Log of  Total Population (Electoral 
Division) 
Census: Small Area 
Population Statistics 
(2011) 
Youth Pop  Percent of the population in the age bracket 
0-19 (Electoral Division) 
Census: Small Area 
Population Statistics 
(2011) 
Unemployed  Persons looking for first job and 
unemployed having lost or given up 
previous work as percentage in working age 
(Electoral Division) 
Census: Small Area 
Population Statistics 
(2011) 
Population 
Density  
Population per km2 (Electoral Division) Census: Small Area 
Population Statistics 
(2011) 
Decision Makers  
Finance Minister  Log of  Distance Finance Minister to Club 
(km) 
Authors own 
calculations 
Sport Minister  Log of  Distance Sport Minister to Club 
(km) 
Authors own 
calculations 
Taoiseach 
 
Log of  Distance Taoiseach to Club (km) Authors own 
calculations 
Tánaiste Log of Distance Tánaiste to Club (km) Authors own 
calculations 
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Table 2 illustrates a county breakdown of successful applicants over the entire period. The 
large urban areas of Dublin and Cork rank highly in regards to the level of funding received by 
applicants during the period along with what was sought. While areas such as Longford and 
Leitrim perform particularly poorly.  Focusing on the third column, which analyses the county 
ratio of received and sought, applicants in Laois received the highest proportion, while 
Longford the least.  
3.2 Sporting Heterogeneity  
Of these 7,615 successful applicants over the period, 69% of them were for; GAA facilities 
(36%), Soccer facilities (16%) or Multisport facilities (17%). Multisport can be a catch all term 
which can include, a joint initiative by two clubs, of different sporting codes, the building of a 
community hall or a grant awarded to a town council. In essence it is difficult to identify the 
exact purpose of the grant but it can be assumed that it is intended for more than one sporting 
activity. However, GAA and Soccer clubs can still benefit from these types of grants. For 
instance in 2012 under Fingal County Council, O’Dwyers GAA club and Balbriggan F.C 
received €120,000 for the construction of an all-weather facility. Examining the percentage of 
the monetary breakdown of allocations by county, again on average GAA facilities received 
44% of the allocation over the period, with Soccer and Multisport accounting for 17% and 
21%, respectively. On a county basis, these three types of facilities took over 90% of funding 
in counties such as Roscommon and Monaghan, while the lowest was in Limerick with circa 
58%. The reason for the low share in Limerick was during the period a substantial level of 
funding went to the redevelopment of Munster Rugby’s Thomand Park. By far the most 
funding goes into the construction of GAA facilities, with it accounting for nearly two thirds 
of allocations in counties such as Cavan, Leitrim and Monaghan during the period. 
Interestingly, only 2% of funding in Leitrim went to Soccer facilities, with the figure being the 
largest in Westmeath with 32% of the allocation. 
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Finally, taking into account the success rates of the various sporting codes in relation to funding 
successful applicants wished to secure, combined over the period GAA facilities, received circa 
50% of their applied funding, Soccer facilities with 54% and Multisport with 49%. However, 
while it appears particular Sports receive much larger shares of funding, do these sports located 
close to key Decision Makers do well also? In order to ensure robust results and a large sample 
when examining the heterogeneity associated with different types of facilities, only the three 
largest types of sports will be used as reported in Table 2.   
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Table 2: Preliminary Data Analysis 2002-2015 
County Received Sought Received/Sought Rank 
Received 
Rank 
Sought 
Received/Sough
t 
GAA Socce
r 
Multispor
t 
Three 
Sports 
Carlow County 5,939,533 11,800,000 50.34 24 25 14 50.8
1 
10.91 12.01 73.73 
Cavan County 8,962,744 17,000,000 52.72 20 20 8 64.4
0 
8.97 14.07 87.44 
Clare County 14,400,000 25,800,000 55.81 14 15 4 46.1
4 
10.54 25.24 81.93 
Cork County 63,100,000 126,000,000 50.08 2 2 16 41.8
7 
13.21 15.30 70.38 
Donegal County 19,400,000 44,700,000 43.40 8 7 25 32.5
6 
28.30 27.05 87.91 
Dublin County 142,000,00
0 
244,000,000 58.20 1 1 2 17.0
6 
24.18 30.73 71.97 
Galway County 29,700,000 59,200,000 50.17 3 4 15 35.3
0 
19.17 26.09 80.56 
Kerry County 25,000,000 52,900,000 47.26 5 5 20 47.2
8 
11.98 23.82 83.09 
Kildare County 23,100,000 40,600,000 56.90 7 9 3 50.6
9 
13.81 11.82 76.33 
Kilkenny County 11,700,000 22,300,000 52.47 18 18 9 46.0
9 
14.80 27.75 88.64 
Laois County 8,532,111 14,000,000 60.94 21 23 1 46.4
6 
11.90 28.20 86.56 
Leitrim County 5,668,854 11,600,000 48.87 25 26 17 65.5
8 
2.31 17.91 85.80 
Limerick County 27,600,000 61,000,000 45.25 4 3 24 28.6
3 
20.89 8.41 57.93 
Longford County 5,390,231 12,500,000 43.12 26 24 26 62.4
7 
9.55 12.44 84.46 
Louth County 15,200,000 28,600,000 53.15 13 13 6 42.8
2 
23.24 16.26 82.32 
Mayo County 16,900,000 33,400,000 50.60 12 11 13 36.0
0 
28.16 12.87 77.03 
Meath County 18,900,000 41,400,000 45.65 9 8 23 49.0
9 
17.37 21.96 88.42 
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Monaghan County 7,804,561 15,300,000 51.01 23 22 11 64.1
2 
12.34 15.53 91.99 
Offaly County 11,800,000 23,300,000 50.64 17 17 12 55.0
9 
10.07 19.25 84.41 
Roscommon 
County 
8,270,691 16,200,000 51.05 22 21 10 50.4
4 
27.13 16.81 94.39 
Sligo County 10,600,000 22,100,000 47.96 19 19 19 17.9
3 
15.87 45.46 79.27 
Tipperary County 23,200,000 50,800,000 45.67 6 6 22 43.6
1 
15.39 25.15 84.15 
Waterford County 17,200,000 36,800,000 46.74 10 10 21 29.4
9 
21.86 36.91 88.25 
Westmeath County 12,300,000 25,600,000 48.05 16 16 18 33.0
1 
31.46 17.38 81.85 
Wexford County 17,200,000 32,500,000 52.92 11 12 7 45.1
5 
24.57 16.31 86.03 
Wicklow County 14,300,000 26,500,000 53.96 15 14 5 44.2
4 
19.70 17.40 81.34 
Total 564,168,72
5 
1,095,900,00
0 
Average       
51.48 
NA NA NA 44.0
9 
17.22 20.85 82.16 
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4. Estimation Method  
Similar to Gaunt (1999) and Suiter & O’Malley (2014a, 2014b) this study employs an OLS 
model to test for the effects of bias in the distribution of sports capital grants. The main model 
of estimation is presented as equation (1): 
icstiii
εβββCCβBββGrant 
210  
 (1) 
Where iGrant  is amount of funding awarded to club i, the 0  is the constant term, while n...1  
are the coefficients, iB is the various measures of political bias, iCC  is a matrix of regional 
characteristics7 associated with club i which influence the magnitude of the grant awarded. t
, s , and c  are a series of dummy variables controlling for year, sporting and county specific 
effects. i  is the error term. In the secondary estimation iGrant is replaced by ivRe which is 
the amount of funding awarded to club i relative to what club i sought.  
For ease of interpretation all variables are converted to their logarithmic form, bar variables 
which measure the unemployment rate, portion of youth in the population and funding a club 
received relative to what was sought. These three variables are measured as a percent. Given 
the error term may suffer from heteroskedasticty or autocorrelation, without addressing for this 
may result in biased estimates. To counter this clustered-robust standard errors are utilised, a 
common approach in the literature (Suiter & O’Malley, 2014a, 2014b; Considine & Doran, 
2016). With the model specified the following section discusses the results. 
5. Results 
5.1 Model Results  
The results for the initial estimation are presented in Table 3. The first equation (1) is the 
logarithm of the total € value of grant allocation a club received in a specific year. Equation 
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(3), (4) and (5) is the sample reduced to include only GAA facilities, Soccer facilities and 
Multisport facilities, respectively.  
Across all estimations a significant negative coefficient is observed for the Sports Minister 
distance variable. This indicates, on average and holding everything else equal the further away 
a successful applicant is from the Minister for Sport’s hometown, the lower the level of grant 
they will receive. It would appear that relationship is particularly pronounced for Soccer 
facilities with a 1% increase in the distance between a successful club and the Sports Minister 
decreases the value of award for a Soccer facility by 11%.  
Regarding the other Ministerial distance variables, both the Minister for Finance and Taoiseach 
are found to have a significant effect on grant allocations as a whole, along with various other 
facilities (Finance – All, GAA, Soccer; Taoiseach – All, GAA, Multisport). The Minister for 
Sport and Finance having a significant influence on the trajectory of sports capital grants is in 
line with results found in Considine et al. (2008),  Suiter and O’Malley (2014a; 2014b), and 
Considine and Doran (2016). However, to date no such study has found the Taoiseach as having 
a significant influence on grant allocations. For the remaining controls in regards to All (1) and 
Soccer (2) successful applicants located in poorer regions on average receive a lower 
magnitude of grant awarded, while successful applicants in more densely populated areas 
receive a higher level. On average larger grants are awarded to more populated regions, as 
noted for All (1) and Soccer (3). While, in relation to GAA (2) and Multisport facilities (4), on 
average, holding all else equal, a 1% increase in the number of youths in the population 
increases the overall monetary allocation to a club for a GAA and multisport facility by circa 
110% and 42%, respectively. Those who engage in Gaelic Games, tend to be skewed towards 
a more youthful demographic, which may explain the strong relationship seen here (Lunn et 
al., 2013).     
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One possibility for the statistical significance of the role of the Taoiseach, may be that during 
the period 2002-2007 the Taoiseach was located in Dublin. As Table 2 noted, Dublin receives 
extremely large levels of grants. Given that a number of national headquarters of sporting 
organisations are located here, a number of large awards which may be utilised throughout the 
country might be being picked up by the Taoiseach distance variable. As local and regional 
projects are allowed to apply for a maximum of €150,000, focusing on these may give a better 
representation of the credit claiming projects to which a politician applies for. Re-estimating 
equation (1) with only these projects, indicates the only Decision Maker variables of 
significance are the Minister for Sport and Finance similar to the results found in previous 
studies.   
Table 3: Dependent Variable - Logarithm of € value club received 
 (1)All 
Facilities  
(2)GAA 
Facilities 
(3)Soccer 
Facilities  
(4)Multisport 
Facilities 
Decision Makers      
Finance Minister 
 
-0.0924*** 
(0.0214) 
-0.1092*** 
(0.0304) 
-0.1097* 
(0.0566) 
0.1019 
(0.1794) 
Sport  Minister -0.0770*** 
(0.0197) 
-0.0825*** 
(0.0282) 
-0.1051* 
(0.0569) 
-0.0763* 
(0.0431) 
Taoiseach 
 
-0.0509** 
(0.0207) 
-0.1122*** 
(0.0365) 
-0.0061 
(0.0574) 
-0.0787* 
(0.0428) 
Tánaiste  0.0038 
(0.0325) 
0.0312 
(0.0560) 
0.0366 
(0.0738) 
0.0154 
(0.0788) 
Control 
Variables 
    
Population 0.0548*** 
(0.0186) 
0.0460 
(0.1703) 
0.0853* 
(0.0436) 
-0.0740 
(0.0532) 
Unemployed -0.6829** 
(0.3050) 
-1.0972** 
(0.4538) 
-0.8408 
(0.6865) 
-0.5682 
(0.8144) 
Youth Population  0.3676 
(0.3489) 
0.9381* 
(0.5499) 
0.2493 
(0.9644) 
1.6141* 
(0.8708) 
Population 
Density 
0.0274** 
(0.0132) 
0.0384* 
(0.0203) 
0.0282 
(0.0322) 
0.0141 
(0.0359) 
Constant 11.2055*** 
(0.2593) 
11.2268*** 
(0.3834) 
10.9831*** 
(0.6578) 
10.1685*** 
(0.6995) 
R2 0.3076 0.1341 0.1744 0.1871 
F 45.20 10.59 5.95 6.67 
P>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Obs. 7,615 2,628 1,203 1,296 
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So while it appears to be the case applicants located close to key decision makers on average 
do particularly well, for a variety of different facilities, does the relationship of pork barrelling 
hold when factoring in the amount of funding a club applied for? These results are presented 
in Table 4.  
While in Table 3 the Sports Minister, Finance Minister and Taoiseach were seen as having a 
significant influence on the trajectory of discretionary sports expenditure, when factoring the 
amount a club received relative to what was sought, only successful applicants near the 
Taoiseach, Tánaiste and Minister for Finance have an influential impact. While successful 
applicants further away from these Decision Makers receive lower portions of funding, they do 
receive more of what they apply for. Put differently, while successful applicants nearer the 
Taoiseach and Minister for Finance’s hometown receive larger awards, these same applicants 
receive a lower proportion of what they apply for. It may be the case as Considine et al. (2008) 
noted that those applicants located proximate to influential decision makers apply for larger 
allocations with the hope their local political figure can deliver for them. For robustness, a 
separate regression was run were the dependent variable was the Logarithm of € value an 
applicant sought. Results indicated that a 1% increase in distance from the hometown of the 
Minister of Sport (-0.0719***), Minister of Finance (-0.0992***) and Taoiseach (-0.0893***) 
see a decrease in the amount of funding an applicant seeks6. This provides evidence that 
successful applicants near key Decision Makers on average seek larger awards. For the 
remaining Control Variables a heterogeneity exists with results. Interestingly, for the entire 
sample (1) along with GAA facilities (2), successful applicants from poorer regions on average 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 99, 95 and 90 percent level.  
Equation (1) controls for Sporting, Year and County effects, while the 
remainder controls for only Year and County effects. Robust Clustered 
Standard Errors in brackets. 
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receive greater portions of funding applied for, while for the same two samples, more youthful 
regions receive a lower portion of funding.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Distance Effects and Decision Makers  
As the results in the previous section highlight that Decision Makers, namely the Taoiseach 
and Minister’s for Sport and Finance can have an influence on the trajectory of spending, they 
do not address the fact that similar to the heterogeneity amongst different sporting facilities, 
there may also be a heterogeneity amongst different individuals. In recent years Considine et 
al. (2008), Considine and Doran (2016), Suiter and O’Malley (2014a, 2014b) have provided 
Table 4: Dependent Variable – Amount Received/Amount Sought (%) 
 (1)All 
Facilities  
(2)GAA 
Facilities 
(3)Soccer 
Facilities  
(4)Multisport 
Facilities 
Decision Makers      
Finance Minister 
 
0.0083** 
(0.0039) 
0.0212*** 
(0.0065) 
-0.0102 
(0.0098) 
0.0158 
(0.0097) 
Sport  Minister -0.0021 
(0.0038) 
1.02E-05 
(0.0065) 
-0.0054 
(0.0134) 
-0.0034 
(0.0096) 
Taoiseach 
 
0.0265*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0330*** 
(0.0079) 
0.0281*** 
(0.0093) 
0.0376*** 
(0.0082) 
Tánaiste 0.0178*** 
(0.0055) 
0.0245** 
(0.0106) 
0.0167 
(0.0117) 
-0.0039 
(0.0139) 
Control 
Variables 
    
Population -0.0026  
(0.0035) 
0.0072 
(0.0065) 
-0.0076 
(0.0084) 
-0.0042 
(0.0093) 
Unemployed 0.1379** 
(0.0562) 
0.1920* 
(0.1036) 
0.1069 
(0.1413) 
-0.1118 
(0.1418) 
Youth Population  -0.1248**  
(0.0619) 
-0.3973*** 
(0.1182) 
-0.1515 
(0.1576) 
0.2072 
(0.1473) 
Population 
Density 
-0.0041  
(0.0025) 
-0.0151*** 
(0.0047) 
-0.0055 
(0.0061) 
0.0079 
(0.0068) 
Constant 0.5608*** 
(0.0378) 
0.4088*** 
(0.0843) 
0.6178*** 
(0.1305) 
0.4080*** 
(0.1251) 
R2 0.1861 0.1553 0.1582 0.2463 
F 36.75 11.84 6.16 10.50 
P>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Obs. 7,615 2,628 1,203 1,296 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 99, 95 and 90 percent level. 
Equation (1) controls for Sporting, Year and County effects, while the 
remainder controls for only Year and County effects. Robust Clustered 
Standard Errors in brackets. 
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more evidence to the presence of pork barrelling so much so, that an informal rule titled the 
Considine Rule7 was brought in to curtail the bias in distribution of local grants. However, 
before this increased commentary and empirical analysis occurred, was the presence of 
rewarding your locality more promient? In order to assess this, additional models were 
estimated which included interaction terms between significant Decision Maker variables and 
individual specific Decision Makers in order to consider individual specific effects. The 
estimated average marginal effects of distance to the Minister for Sport, Finance and Taoiseach 
for the various different individuals from the preferred version of this model are presented in 
Table 5, 6 and 7.  
From Table 5 results suggest that the prevalence of the Minister for Sport rewarding their 
locality has decreased over the years, and under different individuals. Under Jim McDaid and 
John O’Donoghue there appeared to be an extreme bias in targeting allocations in their locality, 
with the estimated average marginal effect being particularly pronounced under McDaid. 
Moreover, Soccer facilities located close to McDaid were rewarded particularly well during 
the period, a sport which the former Minister has a particular affinity too. Similarly, when 
Michael Ring was Minister for Sport it appears that Soccer facilities located proximate to the 
then Minister benefited particularly well. Part of this effect may be driven by the grant of 
€200,000 Westport United FC received, something which the Minister was forced to explain 
to the media7.   
In Table 6 a similar pattern appears with the estimated marginal effects being negative and 
statistically significant under both Bertie Ahern and Brian Cowen. The magnitude, in absolute 
terms is very large for Cowen. One potential reason for this may be that this period was an 
election year and the Taoiseach moved from the Minister of Finance post to his new role. 
Moreover, the former Offaly GAA footballer appeared to reward local GAA facilities 
particularly well during his time in power, along with Multisport projects.  
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Finally, while over the entire sample the evidence of favouritism has diminished recently for 
both the Minister for Sport and Taoiseach, the same is not true for the Minister for Finance. A 
clear bias towards the locality was evident under the last three Minister’s for Finance, with the 
magnitude of the effect particularly strong for Brian Lenihan, no doubt partly explained by the 
upcoming general election in this period.  
However, for the case of the Taoiseach and Minister for Sport it would appear that in more 
recent year’s favouritism or pork barrelling has disappeared. A potential reason for this could 
be attributed to the increased spotlight placed on the distribution of sports capital grants by 
both the media, and academics cited within. Although Considine and Doran (2016) who 
analyse the Considine Rule note that introduction of increased constraints on Minister Ring, 
caused him to engage in providing additional grants in “Non-Local”, “Special” and “Other” in 
his locality – something this dataset doesn’t analyse. 
Table 5: Estimated Marginal Effect of distance (log) by Minister of Sport  
Period Minister All GAA Soccer Multisport 
2002 McDaid -0.1248** 
(-2.41) 
-0.1378 
(-1.49) 
-0.1836* 
(-1.95) 
-0.1056 
(-1.06) 
2003-
2007 
O’Donoghue -0.1198*** 
(-4.15) 
-0.1122*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.0402 
(-0.32) 
-0.1176** 
(-2.25) 
2008 Cullen -0.0409 
(-0.75) 
-0.0688 
(-1.15) 
0.0906 
(1.12) 
-0.1302 
(-0.55) 
2012-
2015 
Ring 0.0387 
(0.82) 
0.0472 
(0.58) 
-0.2532* 
(-1.67) 
0.0323 
(0.29) 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 99, 95 and 90 percent level. The dependent 
variable is natural logarithm of grant. The model is an OLS with clustered standard errors 
and the table indicates the marginal effect of distance (log) by Sports Minister. Absolute 
values of t statistics are presented in parenthesis. 
 
Table 6: Estimated Marginal Effect of distance (log) by Taoiseach  
Period Taoiseach All GAA Soccer Multisport 
2002-2007 Ahern -0.0734*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.1380*** 
(-2.72) 
0.0142 
(0.21) 
-0.0921 
(-1.48) 
2008 Cowen -0.1729** 
(-2.37) 
-0.2231** 
(-2.28) 
0.0651 
(0.32) 
-0.5948** 
(-2.36) 
2012-2015 Kenny 0.0662 
(1.20) 
-0.0054 
(-0.08) 
-0.1219 
(-0.86) 
0.0376 
(0.24) 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 99, 95 and 90 percent level. The dependent 
variable is natural logarithm of grant. The model is an OLS with clustered standard errors 
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and the table indicates the marginal effect of distance (log) by Sports Minister. Absolute 
values of t statistics are presented in parenthesis. 
 
Table 7: Estimated Marginal Effect of distance (log) by Minister of Finance 
Period Minister All GAA Soccer Multisport 
2002-
2004 
McCreevy -0.0415 
(-1.12) 
-0.1800*** 
(-3.39) 
0.0641 
(0.67) 
0.2591 
(2.70) 
2005-
2007 
Cowen -0.0862** 
(-2.16) 
-0.0512 
(-1.09) 
-0.2405* 
(-1.70) 
-0.1117 
(-1.05) 
2008 Lenihan -0.1604*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.1798*** 
(-1.09) 
-0.1419 
(-0.95) 
-0.1137 
(-0.72) 
2012-
2015 
Noonan -0.0969** 
(-2.55) 
-0.0744 
(-1.27) 
-0.2124*** 
(-2.68) 
-0.2017 
(-1.34) 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 99, 95 and 90 percent level. The dependent 
variable is natural logarithm of grant. The model is an OLS with clustered standard errors 
and the table indicates the marginal effect of distance (log) by Sports Minister. Absolute 
values of t statistics are presented in parenthesis. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The research reported here has advanced the literature relating to distributive politics, namely 
in relation to sports expenditure in a number of ways. Firstly, this paper proposes a new method 
of measuring sports pork, namely the portion of funding a club received, relative to the level 
of funding a club applied for. Moreover, to date any analysis, particularly in Ireland has treated 
grants as homogenous, without taking into the account the heterogeneity of different types of 
facilities. Finally, the common dummy variable to measure the location of a key Decision 
Maker is replaced thanks to a novel geocoded dataset, which measures the distance between a 
Decision Maker’s hometown to successful applicant’s location.  
The theory of distributive politics is tested utilising data over the period 2002-2015, with the 
overall monetary value an applicant received, along with the ratio of funding received by a club 
relative to what was sought. Descriptive analysis on a county level note, over the period in 
question Dublin, not only received some of the largest levels of funding, but had one of the 
best success rates of receiving the level of funding applied for. Examining the variation in 
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funding of different sports, three sports tend to dominate. Much of the funding for grants go 
towards GAA, Soccer or Multisport facilities, with these three types of facilities accounting for 
over 80% of funding in some counties.  
Empirically testing the role of Decision Makers, successful applicants geographically 
proximate to the Minister for Sport, Finance and Taoiseach receive larger levels of funding on 
average. Unlike previous studies, the Taoiseach is found to have an influence on the trajectory 
of discretionary capital expenditure. However, this effect appears to be influenced by a small 
number of large rewards, as this relationship disappears focusing on more local grants of 
€150,000 or less.  
In regards to the secondary relationship successful applicants closer to the Taoiseach, Minister 
for Finance and Tánaiste receive a lower proportion of the level of funding they apply for. As 
Considine et al. (2008) notes this may be due to the fact that applicants near influential Decision 
Makers feel that they stand a better chance of securing larger rewards given the political 
influence these individuals possess. Subsequently it is found that applicants near both the 
Minister for Sport, Finance and Taoiseach ask for larger grants, thus providing direct evidence 
to this assertion. Finally, estimating the marginal effects of distance on individual Decision 
Makers it would appear that the prevalence of bias towards the locality has decreased over the 
years for both the Minister for Sport and Taoiseach. However, no such relationship is evident 
for the most recent Minister for Finance.  
This study, over the entire period find the benefits of having an influential figure in your 
locality to increase the magnitude of allocation a club can receive, a relationship which is 
consistent amongst a variety of different facilities. However, when factoring in the level of 
funding these same applicants apply for, no such benefit exists, pointing to the fact that clubs 
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geographically proximate to key Decision Makers on average tend to apply for much larger 
grants.  
Endnotes 
1. Ireland from here on. 
2. While the responsibility for the distribution of sports capital grants have fallen under 
the remit of numerous different government departments and Ministers, for clarity 
throughout this individual/department is referred to as the Minister for Sport.  
3. This is the voting system utilised in Ireland. 
4. This is the smallest level of regional statistical information available. It was chosen as 
it allows a larger level of variability, unlike more aggregated county or constituency 
data. 
5. Due to missing data on grant sought by clubs, some grants are omitted. 
6. See Appendix Table I for regression results. 
7. This informal rule was based on the premise that no county would receive more than 
150%, or less than 75%, of the national average. 
8. Michael Ring noted Westport United FC having never received a grant in previous 
years as one the reasons behind their large allocation.   
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Table I: Dependent Variable - Logarithm of € value club sought 
 (1)All 
Facilities  
(2)GAA 
Facilities 
(3)Soccer 
Facilities  
(4)Multisport 
Facilities 
Decision Makers      
Finance Minister 
 
-0.0992*** 
(0.0227) 
-0.1369*** 
(0.0320) 
-0.0698 
(0.0574) 
-0.5845 
(0.0758) 
Sport  Minister -0.0719*** 
(0.0220) 
-0.0763** 
(0.0336) 
-0.0891 
(0.0622) 
-0.0873* 
(0.0499) 
Taoiseach 
 
-0.0893*** 
(0.0211) 
-0.1700*** 
(0.0349) 
-0.0553 
(0.0547) 
-0.1193** 
(0.0532) 
Tánaiste  -0.0322 
(0.0347) 
-0.0199 
(0.0549) 
0.0160 
(0.0812) 
0.0073 
(0.0870) 
Control 
Variables 
    
Population 0.0613*** 
(0.0199) 
0.0538* 
(0.0305) 
0.1021** 
(0.0470) 
0.0809 
(0.0579) 
Unemployed -0.9659*** 
(0.3241) 
-1.5031*** 
(0.4842) 
-1.0229 
(0.7358) 
-0.3424 
(0.8835) 
Youth Population  0.5682 
(0.3719) 
1.6376*** 
(0.6024) 
0.4309 
(1.0123) 
1.1425 
(0.9293) 
Population 
Density 
0.0371*** 
(0.0141) 
0.0721*** 
(0.0217) 
0.0385 
(0.0343) 
0.0041 
(0.0387) 
Constant 11.9423*** 
(0.2798) 
12.0488*** 
(0.4221) 
11.3335*** 
(0.6991) 
11.1423*** 
(0.7677) 
R2 0.3229 0.1442 0.1806 0.1948 
F 57.64 11.00 5.80 7.05 
P>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Obs. 7,615 2,628 1,203 1,296 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 99, 95 and 90 percent level.  
Equation (1) controls for Sporting, Year and County effects, while the 
remainder controls for only Year and County effects. Robust Clustered 
Standard Errors in brackets. 
